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follow the broader Kieckhefer rule, since it seems least arbitrary and establishes a clear standard."
Such language seems to indicate that the court is not completely
sure of its position and one could not confidently rely on the demand
clause as set out in this case to avoid the restrictions of section
2503(c). Yet, the donor who has decided not to utilize section
2503(c) because of the attendent restrictions might nevertheless
insert a demand clause as was employed in the Crummey case; he
would have nothing to lose.
Larry Losch

Res Judicata-Collateral Estoppel-Application
Between Former Codefendants
The plaintiff Schwartz sought to recover damages against the
defendant administrator of Panoff's estate for injuries resulting
from an automobile accident which occurred when a vehicle,
operated by Schwartz, in which others were passengers, collided
with a vehicle owned by Panoff. This action succeeded one brought
jointly against Schwartz and Panoff by the passengers in Schwartz's
car, wherein the passengers were awarded judgment against both
on the grounds of the joint negligence of the two drivers. Defendant
contended that the first judgment precluded any relief sought by
Schwartz, since his negligence had been determined in the prior
action and thus rendered him contributorily negligent and unable
to recover in the second action. This contention was rejected and
defendant appealed. Held, reversed. Schwartz is collaterally estopped from bringing suit as the issue of his negligence has been determined in the prior action. Schwartz v. Public Administrator of County of Bronx, 30 App. Div. 2d 193, 291 N.Y.S.2d 151 (1968).
In sustaining the defense of res judicata, the court pointed out
that the factual situation required the application of that aspect of
res judicata referred to as collateral estoppel. Thus, the decision
raises a question as to the distinction between the two concepts.
Although both aspects of res judicata, merger and bar and collateral estoppel, have the same general objective-judicial finalitythey are distinct in their operation.' That aspect of res judicata re- 0 Cum ey v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 82, 88 (9th Cir. 1968).
Southern Pac. R.R. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1897).
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ferred to as merger and bar2 applies to repetitious suits involving the
same cause of action.' Thus, where a judgment is for the defendant
on the merits of the case, the cause of action is extinguished, and the
4
judgment acts as a bar to relitigating the same cause of action.
If the judgment is for the plaintiff, the cause of action is again extinguished but rights based on the judgment are added. There is
a merger of the cause of action with the judgment and any further
action must be on the judgment, not on the claim that is merged
with the judgment.'
Collateral estoppel, the other aspect of res judicata, 6 applies
when the second action is upon a different cause of action, and
precludes relitigation in a subsequent proceeding of an issue which
was actually decided in a prior cause of action.' While merger and
bar may affect matters which were not but could have been litigated
in a prior suit upon the same cause of action, collateral estoppel
necessarily affects only those matters actually litigated and determined in a prior action upon a different cause of action.'
When a defense of collateral estoppel is asserted in a second
action involving codefendants in a prior proceeding, the court must
determine whether application of the doctrine would be proper.
The majority of jurisdictions require three essential elements for
application of collateral estoppel. First, there must be an identity
of parties to the action.9 Second, the operation of estoppels must
be mutual; that is, the party invoking the judgment as an estoppel
must also be bound by it."° Third, there must be an identity of the
issue sought to be relitigated." The Schwartz decision requires a
reappraisal of the elements essential to the application of collateral
estoppel.
45, comments a and b at 175 (1942).
3 Comm'r v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948).
4
Lawlor v. National Screen Service Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 326 (1955).
5 Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. International Harvester Co., 120 F.2d 82,
n.4 (3rd Cir. 1941).
6 "Collateral estoppel, despite its development quite apart from the other
aspect of res judicata, seems now to be classified as only a facet of that broad
generic concept." Polasky, Collateral Estoppel-Effects of Prior Litigation,
39 IowA L. REv. 217 (1954).
7Babcock v. Babcock, 63 Cal. App. 2d 94, 146 P.2d 279 (1944).
8 Polasky, Collateral Estoppel-Effects of Prior Litigation, 39 IowA L.
REv. 217, 218 (1954).
9 Gratiot County State Bank v. Johnson, 249 U.S. 246 (1919).
,o Brigham v. Fayerweather, 140 Mass. 411, 5 N.E. 265 (1886).
11Capps v. Whitson, 157 Va. 46, 160 S.E. 71 (1931).
2 RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS §
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In determining whether there is an identity of parties to an action,
many courts utilize the adversarial test set forth in Glaser v. Huette, 2
a case heavily relied upon by the dissent in Schwartz. The court in
Glaser laid down the proposition that there is no estoppel between
parties who were not adverse in the prior litigation. As to co-parties,
the general rule is that they are not adverse unless rights and
liabilities between them were expressly put in issue in the first
action. "
There is, however, another view as to what constitutes adversity
between co-parties. Jurisdictions adhering to this view, while recognizing that a judgment cannot be res judicata between co-parties
upon a different cause of action, hold that when an issue was determined in a prior suit against co-parties, then the requirement of
identity of parties is satisfied. 4
Some courts discard both the mutuality and identity of parties
criteria and require only that the issues in the subsequent action
be identical with those in the preceeding one.' 5 The problem remains with respect to this approach, however, as to what constitutes
identical issues.' 6 In making this determination, one view specifically
follows the reasoning that there are no issues that are identical between parties which were not litigated between those parties.'"
The other view, which the majority adopted in Schwartz, holds
that the mere fact the parties in the prior action have not litigated
an issue against each other does not preclude collateral estoppel
from being invoked where the issues do not vary in the subsequent
action from those decided in the prior action.' 8
It is interesting to note that both the majority and the dissent in
Schwartz based their reasoning on Judge Halpern's concurring
opinion in Ordway v. White.' 9 The majority cited that part of the
opinion which stated, in effect, that it would be proper to deny a
former codefendant another opportunity to litigate issues adjudicated
in the first action. The court reasoned that simply because one
12 232 App. Div. 119, 249 N.Y.S. 374, ajj'd mem., 256 N.Y. 686, 177
N.E. 193 (1931).
'3 Bunge v. Yager, 236 Minn. 245, 52 N.W.2d 446 (1952).
14 E.g., Pack v. McCoy, 251 N.C. 590, 112 S.E.2d 118 (1960).
I5 King, Collateral Estoppel and Motor Vehicle Accident Litigation in
New York, 36 FORDHAM L. -REv. 1 (1967). See also B. R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall,
19 N.Y.2d 141, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596, 225 N.E.2d 195 (1967) which calls the
doctrine of mutuality a "dead letter."
16 Polasky, Collateral Estoppel-Effects o1 Prior Litigation, 39 IowA L.
REv. 217, 223 (1954).
17 Byrum v. Ames & Webb, Inc., 196 Va. 597, 85 S.E.2d 364 (1955).
18 Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., 1 N.Y.2d 116, 134 N.E.2d 97 (1956).
19 14 App. Div. 2d 498, 217 N.Y.S.2d 334 (1961) (concurring opinion).
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party did not exercise his right to cross-claim in the first action20
or avail himself of the opportunity to explain away his negligence,
was no reason to preclude the invocation of collateral estoppel.
However, the only way to determine if the issues in a subsequent
action are identical with those that have been determined is to review the record of the first action and make the determination on
that basis." This reasoning, also in the Ordway majority opinion,
was picked up by the minority in Schwartz, along with the idea
that it could be possible that a codefendant's negligence in the initial
action would have no relation to the collision itself but he would
nonetheless be liable to a plaintiff in a prior action.22
For example, a driver of an automobile negligently permitted a
passenger to remain in the car while being pursued at a high rate
of speed by a second automobile. There was an accident in which
the passenger was killed. The passenger's administrator brought an
action against the driver of both vehicles and was awarded judgment. Subsequently, the driver of the host car sued the pursuing
driver for negligence. The defense of res judicata was asserted but
the court said that it was not inconsistent to find that the plaintiff in
the second action could be found not contributorily negligent as to
the accident itself while being found to have breached a duty owed
to a passenger. In other words, her negligence in permitting the
passenger to remain in the car adjudicated in the first action did
not in itself contribute to the accident.23
Similarly, a passenger in a bus recovered against the owner of the
bus and the owner of an automobile involved in a collision. In a
subsequent action between the codefendants it was held that the
judgment entered in the first action was not a bar to the present
suit. The bus owner owed the passenger the high degree of care
which a common carrier, by virtue of its contractual relations, owes
to its passengers, but did not owe a similar duty to the driver of
the vehicle, and therefore24 could be liable to the passenger and yet
recover from the motorist.
Authority in West Virginia pertaining to the kind of problem
presented in Schwartz is scarce. However, in one case it was held
20

N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3019(a) (McKinney 1963).
Ordway v. White, 14 App. Div. 2d 498, 217 N.Y.S.2d 334, 341 (1961)
opinion).
(concurring
22
Thornton, Further Comment on Collateral Estoppel, 28 BROOKLYN
L. REv. 250 (1962).
23Terwliger v. Terwilliger, 52 Misc. 2d 404, 276 N.Y.S.2d 8 (1966).
24 Capps v. Whitson, 157 Va. 46, 160 S.E. 71 (1931).
21
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that issues raised in the second action must be identical with those
raised and decided in the first action before the doctrine of collateral
estoppel may be invoked.2 5 Likewise, in an earlier decision, the
West Virginia court held that unless codefendants had properly
pleaded the issue of liability on certain bonds in the first suit and
had the issue decided as between them, they were not barred from
again raising the question in a second suit against each other.2
This indicates that West Virginia follows the adversarial test as to
both issues and parties as espoused in the majority of jurisdictions.
In the latest West Virginia case on the subject of collateral estoppel, although the litigants were not co-parties in the prior action,
the court explicitly stated that identity as to parties and issues plus
mutuality of estoppel must be present to sustain a plea of collateral
estoppel. The court stated:
[W]here the causes of action are not the same, the parties
being identical or in privity, the bar extends to only those matters that were actually litigated in the former proceeding, as
distinguished from those matters that might or could have
been litigated therein, and arise by way of estoppel rather than
by way of strict res adjudicata.2"
This West Virginia decision is in keeping with the West Virginia
Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the Rules, a cross-claim between
co-parties to an action may be filed, but it is not mandatory.2"
According to the reasoning in Schwartz, it appears that a claim
arising out of the same event between co-parties must be asserted
in the initial action or be barred in a subsequent action. While
the New York Civil Procedure Act does not require mandatory
cross-claims in actions arising out of the same event or transaction,
a party who decides not to file a cross-claim runs the risk that in
a subsequent action the court, relying on Schwartz, will rule that
the issue upon which his cause of action is based has already been
adjudicated and that he is estopped from bringing the action.
Kenneth Joseph Fordyce
JamesDavid Nash, Jr.
25

Soto v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 142 W. Va. 373, 95 S.E.2d 769 (1956).
Central Banking and Security Co. v. United States Fidelity and
Guaranty Co., 73 W. Va. 197, 80 S.E. 121 (1913). But see Hood v. Morgan,
47 W. Va. 817, 35 S.E. 911150(1900).
W. Va. 96, 100, 144 S.E.2d 234, 236 (1965).
27 Lane v. Williams,
28 W.
VA. R. Civ. P. 13(g).
29
N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3019(a) (McKinney 1963).
26
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